The foundation of value

Lennart Nørreklit

Professor Emeritus, Aalborg University, Denmark.

E-mail: lennartnorreklit@gmail.com

The problem how to integrate values in an empirical world is part of a general philosophical problem on how to understand ethics and analyse the good and right. Values cannot, it seems, be defined in a naturalist and empirical manner. The paper starts by outlining this problem. And ends offering a solution which is based on separating three ‘spheres’ of language games, three spheres of social reality.

The sphere of liking and loving. This is a subjective and very existential sphere concerned with personal and individual phenomena of peoples liking and loving. This is the very sensitive and inner driving motivator of a human person. It has to be protected and it is almost non-existent in the discourses of the public realm.

Secondly, the sphere of values. This is a sphere of objectifications. The values are social as well as personal objectifications - i.e. here is the value dimension. As objectified phenomena they are much more directly constructs than the phenomena of loving and liking. Thus, they are influenced through actions, externalizations and reasoning as any other objectification.

Finally, there is the sphere of goodness and reflection. This is the language game of reflection that connects the two previous spheres. The concept of goodness is a vehicle of integration. It always demands a reason and thus it installs language games of reflection. The objectification of values is the basic product of this work of reasoning to clarify and determine the good.

The social reasoning constitutes the social system of values. The personal reasoning - supported by the processes of socialisation - produces the personal values. And the ongoing reflection in life concerns the endeavour to maintain a viable relation between the personal and the social objectified values - viable in the sense that it support the loving approach to life - not only of a person for him/herself but also of the other persons.

This analysis has significant consequences for the analysis and evaluation of language games in social practices: It is presumed that the public language games do not directly involve the personal language games related to loving but that it is the same time respects the others endeavour to realise personal values that are in accordance with their loving approach to life. - Without that respect, the problem language game loses its respect and recognition of the other and gets an oppressive and hostile nature.